<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Quorint research</title><description>Independent security research and audits for blockchains, L1 protocols, zero-knowledge systems, and smart contracts. Published audit reports and vulnerability disclosures.</description><link>https://quorint.xyz/</link><item><title>Decimal-Exponent Bomb in Gonka: Halting Consensus via Pre-Ante Rescaling and authz.MsgExec</title><link>https://quorint.xyz/research/gonka-decimal-exponent-bomb/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://quorint.xyz/research/gonka-decimal-exponent-bomb/</guid><description>How an unbounded int32 exponent in Gonka&apos;s custom Decimal wire type turns shopspring/decimal rescaling into a pre-ante CPU/RAM bomb—and how wrapping it in authz.MsgExec bypasses CheckTx to trigger a post-commit block of death.</description><pubDate>Wed, 14 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>gonka</category><category>cosmos-sdk</category><category>cometbft</category><category>consensus</category><category>dos</category><category>golang</category></item><item><title>Two Critical Consensus-Divergence Vulnerabilities in Zcash&apos;s Zebra Node: Catching Unauthenticated Chain Splits Before Release</title><link>https://quorint.xyz/research/zebra-pre-release-consensus-divergences/</link><guid isPermaLink="true">https://quorint.xyz/research/zebra-pre-release-consensus-divergences/</guid><description>How two Critical consensus-divergence vulnerabilities in Zebra&apos;s zcash_primitives transaction refactor (#10461)—an unauthenticated nExpiryHeight bypass across 2.14 billion wire values and an orphaned {2..100}-byte coinbase scriptSig check—would have let any user or miner split Zcash mainnet, and how we caught both on main before they shipped in a release.</description><pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate><category>zcash</category><category>zebra</category><category>zakura</category><category>consensus</category><category>chain-split</category><category>rust</category></item></channel></rss>